CA safety (Re: Microsoft supporting tyrants?)
reiter at fsfeurope.org
Fri Mar 25 13:01:59 UTC 2011
Am Freitag, 25. März 2011 11:18:34 schrieb Werner Koch:
> On Fri, 25 Mar 2011 11:07, Torsten.Grote at fsfe.org said:
> > Because it is not as easy as collecting some hardware components and
> > because not as many people are intersted in the topic.
> And because such a list doesn't help. In a browser all CAs are
> implicitly cross-certified. Thus a single not that well managed CA sets
> the entire security level to its own.
The list would help so that people can make a concious decision about
their minimum level of their set of root CAs. Yes, it is just one piece of the
puzzle. In addition implementations must add more.
> Even if all CAs would technically
> and organizational work at par I am pretty sure that a government or a
> bigcorp is able to convince its home CA to create a fraudulent certificate.
Sure, though then I'd rather trust a root CA from the US or Germany
then I would trust one from Libya. At least I can decide.
FSFE -- Deputy Coordinator Germany (fsfeurope.org)
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