Analysis on balance: Standardisation and Patents

simo simo.sorce at xsec.it
Tue Dec 2 22:04:09 UTC 2008


On Tue, 2008-12-02 at 21:42 +0000, Alex Hudson wrote:

> GPLv2 worked in the same way too I think (though not worded as 
> explicitly as it is in v3). In general, I tend to think of sublicensing 
> as being very rare - you only really need it if you're changing the 
> license (or, at least, varying it somehow).
> 
> > Well, in theory the whole point of IPR is that those things which are not
> > valuable (common knowledge, lacking a creative input (in copyrights) or an 
> > inventive step (patents) are in the public domain. Those things which cost 
> > money/labour to create/invent are privatized in the hope this incentivises 
> > people to invest that labour or money. If you can get the returns of that 
> > privatization without making the investment, that's a failure mode of the 
> > system, no?
> >   
> 
> I wouldn't say so, in the same way that not getting any returns by 
> making that same investment also isn't a failure mode of the system 
> either. It's a system of risk.

If there is no investment what are you rewarding ?
A monopoly is a serious business, if there is no reason to grant one it
shouldn't be granted or you simply create a distortion in the market.
And we know how is always easier is for the wealthier to push a bit
further.

The patent system should reward risk takers that actually made the
investment, because if you don't, in the long term you will get no
investments.

If you can get a monopoly whether you invest or not, it is only normal
that you will shift toward getting patents where investment is not
needed given that no investment == no risk.

So by allowing patents where there is no investment you just end up
negating the reason d'etre of the patents themselves: to promote
investment.

Simo.




More information about the Discussion mailing list