sad treacherous computing day
Alfred M. Szmidt
ams at gnu.org
Mon May 7 14:28:24 UTC 2007
On Mon, 2007-05-07 at 15:52 +0200, Alfred M. Szmidt wrote:
> This is the exact case I stated, prohibiting others from updating
> their software. It is one thing to _verify_ the binary, and still
> allow it to run, and another to simply say `You're bad! Go away bad
> person!'; and this is exactly what DRM/TC does. Signing binaries is a
> great way to check their integrity, but that doesn't mean that one
> shouldn't be able to run unverifiable binaries. So I still don't see
> how DRM/TC can be a useful thing.
Let's try to make it clear. I don't want Alfred Szmidt to be able
to get access to my machine and take it over by installing his
malicious kernel or any of his malicious binaries. I, myself,
under my personal control, do you get it?
This example has nothing to do with TC or DRM. This is how just about
any modern operating system works. I cannot update the kernel on this
machine since I do not have the permission to do so because the kernel
disallows me to do that task, but there is no need for a specially
crippled chip for this task. So I still do not see the use of DRM/TC.
You are confusing two things, hardware and software. TC is purley
hardware based, and TC with DRM is even more evil.
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