sad treacherous computing day

[simo]

On Mon, 2007-05-07 at 15:52 +0200, Alfred M. Szmidt wrote:

> This is the exact case I stated, prohibiting others from updating
> their software.  It is one thing to _verify_ the binary, and still
> allow it to run, and another to simply say `You're bad! Go away bad
> person!'; and this is exactly what DRM/TC does.  Signing binaries is a
> great way to check their integrity, but that doesn't mean that one
> shouldn't be able to run unverifiable binaries.  So I still don't see
> how DRM/TC can be a useful thing.

Let's try to make it clear.
I don't want Alfred Szmidt to be able to get access to my machine and
take it over by installing his malicious kernel or any of his malicious
binaries.
I, myself, under my personal control, do you get it?

>    Do you leave your machine passwordless with all files set to 777 ?
> 
> I actually do.

Your choice of how to use a technology, you are allowed to because you
are in control of the password database and the access control api to
change access control on files. Exactly the same can be for TC and DRM.
It is just a matter of who controls the technology, no more, no less.

Simo.