Key escrow in the UK

Immanuel Witschi immanuel at gmx.ch
Thu Jul 28 20:28:20 UTC 2005


I like to make aware that encryption-keys are being used
- beside of encrypting content - also for authentication of the sender
or receiver of a message. So I wouldn't want to give my private key,
because I couldn't guarantee anymore the authenticity of my postings.

Immanuel Witschi



Am Donnerstag, den 28.07.2005, 19:49 +0200 schrieb Jeremiah Foster:
> After the terrible, cowardly acts by terrorists in the UK, something 
> that we all deplore, there has come the request from the Police to 
> escrow the private keys used in dual key encryption. Apparently, much 
> of the information held on the computers that the Police seized were 
> encrypted, frustrating Police efforts to easily read that information. 
> Now there are public calls by the Police to allow them to engage in key 
> escrow so that when they have to break into a computer they have the 
> private key and do not have to use brute force or whatever method they 
> currently use, (is there any other method?)
> 
> I would like to discuss this with the membership of this list and 
> fellows at the FSFE. Is it permissible to allow key escrow by the 
> authorities? Is this type of encryption too powerful to be in the hands 
> of enemies of the state who take innocent lives? What are the limits on 
> privacy? On public authorities invasion of privacy? How can we address 
> the public need for information with the private need for privacy?
> 
> 
> Jeremiah Foster
> 
> http://www.devmodul.com
> jeremiah.foster at devmodul.com
> Tel/Mobil: +46 (0)730 930 506
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Discussion mailing list
> Discussion at fsfeurope.org
> https://mail.fsfeurope.org/mailman/listinfo/discussion
> 
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